"Many incidents and accidents in
civil aviation have been attributed to human factors and the most
prominent of these factors is miscommunication. While working in ATC units
and also while imparting training as OJT instructor and later as CATC
instructor; I, personally also have come across many such instances. It is
difficult to quote and discuss all of them in detail here. But, in
retrospect it was found that there are many reasons for such
miscommunication. Majority of times it is because of the language problem
as English is not our mother tongue but sometimes it is due to
complacency, overconfidence of person and other factors such as poor
knowledge of procedures and phraseology etc. Honestly speaking, such
examples of miscommunication are evident not only in trainees but also in
many working and experienced controllers. I recently came across a useful
document, which is a research paper by a Sydney based Air Traffic
controller, that deals with this aspect of human factor. I have taken out
only a small and relevant portion out of that document and I hope it will
enlighten all of us."
Introduction
The collision between the Pan Am and KLM Boeing 747's
at Tenerife in March 1977, which killed 583 people, was a defining event
in aviation safety. While there were many predisposing human factors
involved, the accident was a tragic lesson in miscommunications. The
accident demonstrated that, in the aviation industry, "information
transmitted by radio communication can be understood in a different way to
that intended, as a result of ambiguous terminology and/or the
obliteration of key words or phrases" and that "the oral transmission of
essential information, via single and vulnerable radio contacts, carries
with it great potential dangers" .
Amongst controllers there is insufficient awareness of
the pervasiveness of the miscommunication problem and its various
manifestations. The insidiousness of some of these requires that
controllers be provided with a deeper insight into the structures of
language and the way which phrases and words can be misinterpreted.
Types of Miscommunication
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Absent-mindedness and Slips
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Ambiguity
-
Callsign Confusion
-
Code Switching
-
Different Voices
-
Emergencies
-
Enunciation
-
Expectation
-
Headsets
-
Homonyms and Homophony
-
Noise
-
Not Hearing
-
Number Problems
-
Open microphones
-
Readback Error
-
Similarity of SIDs, STARs and
Waypoints
-
Speech Acts
-
Speed of Delivery and Pauses
-
Vigilance
1. Absent-mindedness and Slips
Absent-mindedness is a form of miscommunication which
controllers and pilots will make occasionally. For instance, a controller
may routinely assign the same level for descent to arriving aircraft. But
on one occasion that conflicting traffic at that level has been noted, the
controller may still absent-mindedly assign that level to an inbound
aircraft instead of providing level separation. Such slips are usually
associated with some degree of attentional 'capture' such as an internal
preoccupation or external distraction. The crucial point about
absentminded errors is that they are a characteristic of highly skilled or
habitual activities (National Research Council, 1997; Reason, 1984). They
are not signs of incompetence but of misapplied competence. They are a
problem of experts, not of beginners. Thus the probability of making an
absent-minded slip actually increases with task proficiency because, as we
become more skilled at an activity, the less demands it makes upon our
working memory. We perform at an automatic, subconscious level. Reason
(1984) uses this example: should we inadvertently turn on the toaster
instead of the coffee pot, the result is inconvenient. Should we make
precisely the same mistake in the control room, the result may be
catastrophic. The circumstances will determine the extent of the penalty.
In such cases, the standard response of additional training would appear
to be counter-intuitive. Spoonerisms and verbal blends are other forms of
slips. Named after the Reverend W.A. Spooner (1844-1930), who said such
things as "queer old Dean" when he meant "dear old Queen", they are most
likely to occur when a controller is busy as, too, are verbal blends such
as 'Tangee Yankee Delta' instead of 'Tango Yankee Delta'.
2. Ambiguity
As this paper has revealed, ambiguity can arise from
many aspects of verbal communications. It has been implicated in many
aviation accidents such as the 1992 Air Inter Flight 148 crash on Mont
Sainte- Odile in France which killed 87 people where, because of the use
of "less-than-optimum phraseology by both the flight crew and the
controller, their respective intentions and expectations were ambiguous".
This led to a sudden workload peak for the crew just prior to the crash.
Workload may increase vagueness and imprecision. Vague
vernacular, such as jargon and acronyms, may confuse pilots or
controllers. Vagueness is also a social affectation, considered polite
when addressing superiors, but it may also restrict the flow of
information between ATC team members, reducing situational awareness.
Vagueness is often associated with trainee controllers and disappears with
experience. Words with uncertain reference, such as the pronouns 'him' or
'it' or indefinite nouns such as 'things', may be ambiguous and can cause
confusion, as we saw in the Florida Everglades crash in 1972.
A lack of definition can also be included here when
controllers and pilots have differing understandings of words and
procedures. In 1974 a Boeing 727 approaching Dulles Airport, Washington,
was "cleared for a VOR/DME approach" which the pilot understood to mean he
was
cleared to the final approach altitude of 1800 feet and
that there was no other terrain above that level on his route. The
controller understood it to mean that the aircraft could descend without
conflicting with other traffic and that the pilot was responsible for
terrain avoidance. The aircraft crashed into a mountain. The subsequent
inquiry found that there was confusion by both pilots and controllers
regarding each other's responsibilities; everyone simply made their own
interpretation.
It found that pilots were often unsure of the type of
radar service they were receiving. Twenty-five years later Airservices
Australia is still encountering the problem. Pilots must be aware that the
responsibility has shifted from the controller to them and is therefore
incumbent on the controller to use standard phraseologies to ensure that
pilots are in no doubt.
3. Callsign Confusion
Aircraft callsign confusion is a vexation throughout
the world. It hampered ATC assistance to the charter DC-8 with an
in-flight fire at Jeddah in 1991 which killed 261 people, was implicated
in the Boeing B737 and Metroliner collision in Los Angeles in 1991, and
has caused numerous other incidents when pilots have accepted clearances
meant for others. There have been calls in the UK and North America for a
central system for controlling the allocation of callsigns. One recent
Confidential Aviation Incident Report (CAIR) complained that the following
aircraft were on the same frequency: New Zealand 88, Qantas 28, Qantas 88,
Qantas 188, Air Nippon 828 and Air Nippon 888. The writer complained of
several mistakes on the radio.
(Apparently the number '8' has significance in the
Asian market-another example of how culture may impinge on aviation
safety). There has been a continuing trial of flight number callsigns in
Australia. Job (1997) has argued against its acceptance due to the
potential for confusion. Registration callsigns have 26 possible last
letters whereas
numbers have only 10. Also, he writes, crews become
familiar with their registration callsign during a flight, but a flight
number changes every leg. Following feedback from the industry, the flight
number element of the callsign has recently been reduced from 4 digits to
2 for domestic flights. In my experience, registration callsigns play a
significant role in situational awareness because pilots and controllers
quickly learn to recognise aircraft-type/callsign associations (i.e.
Foxtrot Kilo Golf is a Fokker F28, Romeo Mike Foxtrot is a B767).
4. Code Switching
Code switching refers to the habitual switching back
and forth from one language to another of bilingual and multilingual
speakers during the course of a conversation. This is due to inherent
social and cognitive features of how language works that are still poorly
understood.
Perhaps the most well known example of this occurred at
Tenerife . The problem can also arise between speakers of the same
language when different dialects are in use. Most importantly, it can
arise when pilots or controllers switch between the common usage of a word
and
its more defined aviation equivalent. Cushing (1995)
provides the communications transcript of the 1981 John Wayne Orange
County Boeing 737 crash where the controller and pilots used the word
'hold' to mean 'stop' (its aviation meaning) and 'to continue' (as in
'hold your course' in ordinary English). Just what 'hold' meant in each
transmission in which it was used led to confusion, wheels up landing,
34 injuries, and an aircraft destroyed by post-impact
fire.
5. Different Voices
Voices become familiar, and it can confuse the pilot if
a different controller from the one expected replies, and confuse the
controller if parts of a single dialogue with the crew of an aircraft are
with different crew members.
A controller may be unsure that the correct aircraft
has received the instructions, especially since pilots sometimes mix up
their callsigns if they have flown several different aircraft recently.
6. Emergencies
Language skills diminish as tension rises during
in-flight emergencies. Tasks take priority which means that controllers
may have to concentrate in order to deliver slow, clear speech, especially
those for whom English is not their first language. Distraction with an
emergency may cause slips with communications with other aircraft.
7. Enunciation
Poor enunciation by a sender leads to doubt by the
receiver as to what has been heard. Many controllers are not aware that
they have inadequate enunciation and that it is the reason for
unacknowledged instructions or requests for message repeats. Some people
find certain
words innately difficult to enunciate, particularly
when they are busy, so, for example, 'Juliet Juliet Tango' becomes 'Jew
Jew Tango' and a 'Bulls 2 arrival' becomes 'Buws 2 arrival'.
8. Expectation
We have discussed how we use expectation and context to
hear and understand what has been said. Messages are misunderstood because
the listener incorrectly infers the intended message. Expectation errors
are a particularly insidious form of miscommunication because readbacks
may indicate that the message has been received correctly when, in fact,
it has not. Byron (1997) cites an example where an aircraft was cleared to
climb to FL310 and at FL260 the controller asked about the aircraft's
speed. The pilot answered "315 knots". The controller said "maintain 280",
to which the pilot responded "280 knots".
The pilot slowed the aircraft to 280 knots and
continued climbing. As it climbed through FL295, the controller said that
the aircraft was cleared only to FL280. In this case, the controller had
set a context of airspeed and failed to indicate, due to his poor
phraseologies (i.e. not saying "maintain flight level 280"), that the
subject had changed to altitude, nor did he vigilantly monitor the
readback and detect the pilot say "knots".
9. Headsets
III-fitting headsets cause many miscommunications
problems because the microphones tend to drop away from the mouth.
Microphone clipping occurs when a controller (or pilot) fails to ensure
that the microphone switch is activated prior to speaking, or deselects it
prior to finishing speaking. Since the aircraft's callsign is the first
part of a control message, dropping the first letter from the callsign may
mean, for example, 'Echo Alpha Kilo' accepts a message meant for 'Tango
Alpha Kilo'. In order to detect this, recent changes
require pilots to place their callsign last when acknowledging an
instruction (i.e. "six thousand, Tango Alpha Kilo"). Problems with
clipping of 'affirmative' and 'negative' led to the former being changed
to 'affirm'. Microphone clipping is most likely to occur when controllers
and pilots are busy or training.
10. Homonyms and Homophony
The Flying Tigers Boeing B747 crash at Kuala Lumpur in
1989 demonstrates the misinterpretation which may occur with the homonyms
'to, too and two'. Visibility was only two miles in fog as the
aircraft was issued the clearance, "Descend to two
seven zero zero" (two thousand seven hundred feet) to which the pilot
responded, "Roger, cleared to two thousand seven hundred. We're out of
fortyfive".
The next clearance was, "Descend two four zero zero"
(two thousand four hundred feet) to which the pilot replied, "OK, four
zero zero" (four hundred feet). The four crew, who did not heed the ground
proximity warning alarm, were killed when the freighter crashed 8 miles
from the runway (Waldock, 1994). Had the controller not dropped the
'to' in the second instruction and instructed "descend
to two four zero zero", or detected the incorrect readback, the accident
would have been avoided. Controllers often encounter this problem with
these homonyms and appear to use two different techniques to overcome it.
One is to pronounce 'to' as 'tah'; the other is to
emphasise 'to' as in "descend to two seven zero zero". Homophony is
a "confusion-inducing phenomena" due to different words or phrases
sounding exactly or nearly alike (Cushing, 1994:12).
Examples are 'left' and 'west', and aerodromes such as
'Morawa' and 'Moora', 'Cowra' and 'Corowa". We saw earlier that in the
Canadian Pacific accident in Sydney, 'take taxiway right' was heard as
'you can backtrack if you like'.
11. Noise
Noise causes message distortion and may be due to
cockpit or ATC centre background noise, equipment noise, environmental
noise (atmospheric static), substandard headsets or poor microphone
technique.
12. Not Hearing
The problem of visual dominance phenomenon was
discussed earlier. Not hearing important information is a clear sign that
the controller involved is overtaxed. Such strain affects the hearing
first before affecting the ability to think clearly and motor/manual
dexterity.
13. Number Problems
Errors with numbers are ubiquitous, whether it be with
callsigns, levels, heading, speeds, tracks, winds, latitudes and
longitudes, and so on. It seems to occur most often when controllers give
headings and distances in conjunction with altitudes. Numbers are likely
to be transposed and the error may not be picked up in the pilot readback.
Indeed, the pilot may read it back correctly but enter
the transposed sequence into the aircraft's flight management system.
14. Open microphones
Stuck microphones tend to occur in aircraft when
handset switches unknowingly get jammed. This blankets out transmissions
by other aircraft and the controller. The controller relies on other
pilots recognising the situation and returning to their previous or
another frequency for instructions. This situation is obviously dangerous
if aircraft are in conflict with each other and require separation, but it
also adds workload to adjacent controllers relaying instructions for the
affected sector.
15. Readback Error
Readback of pertinent parts of a controller's
instructions does not guarantee that the readback message has been
accurately received. Too often, confirmation is given of an incorrect
readback. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (USA) has labelled this
phenomenon hearback and cited four major causes. similar aircraft callsigns resulting in confusion
in transmission or reception; only one pilot on board working and monitoring the
frequency; numerical errors, such as confusing 'one zero
thousand' with 'one one thousand'; expectancy-hearing what one expects to hear.
16. Similarity of SIDs, STARs and Waypoints
The similarity of names for standard instrument
departures or arrivals may cause confusion and mistakes. Morrow (1997)
cites two transitions 'Wave 1' and Wave 2' and two SIDs 'Dorval 5' and 'Dorval
6'-these are neither unambiguous nor error-tolerant because they are too
similar. A
pilot may mistakenly fly the wrong one. Waypoint
similarity can cause confusion. ROTAP and RONSA are similar distances from
Perth to the north-east and -west respectively, as are POKIP and POMOT. A
busy controller can mentally reverse the position of the two and develop a
separation plan based on the incorrect route.
17. Speech Acts
Complexity is introduced into language resulting from
the variety of functions-speech acts-that any sentence can represent, such
as statement, question, request, and so on. As we discussed earlier,
subtle differences in intonation and placement of pauses affects the way
we interpret words. But when we are distracted, stressed or careless,
these verbal 'keys' may be omitted or displaced, resulting in
miscommunications. Hawkins (1993:169) provides an example of a near-miss
at Stuttgart in 1977 when a query of "flight level 80 clear?"
was interpreted as a statement "flight level 80 clear".
In the resulting confusion, two aircraft passed within 400m of each other
at the same level.
I have had the good fortune to hear a colleague prod a
pilot for a readback of an assigned altitude by requesting, with voice
intonation, "and level?", to which the pilot replied "affirm", meaning he
was flying level!
18. Speed of Delivery and Pauses
During peak traffic periods, controllers in some
positions may be talking constantly. Difficult as it may be, if
controllers pause between transmissions to different aircraft, the amount
of irrelevant information received by pilots is reduced. This increases
the pilot's chance of remembering and reduces requests for reiteration.
Cushing (1994) refers to the danger of the 'delayed dangling phrase', an
add-on during a transmission to a sentence that sounds, tonally and in
contents, to have already terminated. Such afterthoughts risk being over
transmitted and important information missed, as was the case in the
Boeing 707 crash in the Azores in 1989.
The rapid speed at which controllers deliver
instructions is probably the most common miscommunication complaint
received from pilots.
19. Vigilance
Maintaining vigilance for critical but infrequent
events, such as a pilot reading back an incorrect level, is an important
part of air traffic control. Traditionally, maintaining vigilance has been
thought of as undemanding and boring but recent research shows that it
imposes considerable mental effort and that this does not simply arise
from the controller's efforts to overcome tedium (National Research
Council, 1997). Issues of vigilance involve many types of human attributes
such as boredom, stress, tiredness, personal problems and so on.
Note:- The above list and short discussions of
common forms of miscommunication are by no means comprehensive but it does
give an indication of the scope of the problem. There is a great deal of
overlapping, so the investigation of any incident is likely to provide
examples at several levels, as with the much studied Tenerife accident.
Miscommunication also involves such complex human
attributes as complacency, fatigue, professionalism, personal problems,
and so on.
Shri Rakesh Bhatnagar is
Asst. GM(ATC) with Airports Authority of India and presently posted as
Instructor in Civil Aviation Training College, Allahabad, India.
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